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Incentives to lenders to provide financin~ 
to borrowers who are the subject of banlc 
By Paul M. Baisier and David G. Epstein** 
A bankruptcy debtor ;, not viewed by most lenders as a desirable customer. Most lenders arc un-
derstandably reluctant to extend credit to such a borrower. This reluctance compounds the difficulties of a 
bankruptcy debtor. Without new financing, the cash needs of a debtor often will cause the debtor's assets to be 
liquidated, thereby foreclosing any hope of reorganization and defeating the rehabilitative purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code.1 
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To counter the understandable re-
luctance of financial institutions to 
lend to bankruptcy debtors, section 
364 of the Bankruptcy Code provides 
incentives to lenders to provide fi-
nancing to borrowers who are the sub-
ject of bankruptcy cases. Section 364 
enables a debtor to obtain credit by 
granting a prospective lender a variety 
of different incentives, some of which 
are not available on a nonconsensual 
basis outside of the bankruptcy con-
text. 2 
Section 364 
Section 364 (a) 
T he starting point for analyz-ing the provisions for post-petition financing in the 
Bankruptcy Code is section 364(a).3 
Section 364(a) provides that a debtor 
may obtain unsecured credit in the 
"ordinary course of business" without 
approval of the bankruptcy court. 
This treatment is consistent with the 
Chapter 11 concept of the "debtor-in-
possession," that allows the debtor to 
continue to operate its business in the 
ordinary course. 4 To qualify under 
section 364(a), the credit must fund 
qn expense that is otherwise eligible 
for treatment as an administrative ex-
pense under section 503(b). To be so 
eligible, the credit must be extended 
to fund an expense that is not allow-
able under section 502(f) and is an 
"actual, necessary cost [or] expense of 
preserving the estate."5 
Section 364(b) 
A consequence of the requirement 
that the credit be extended in the "or-
dinary course of business" is that the 
financing provided under section 
364(a) is usually limited to trade cred-
it. Other lenders do not generally rely 
on this section, as whether extensions 
of credit are made "in the ordinary 
course of business" is a fact-based 
question that is not always easily an-
swered. Moreover, section 364(b) pro-
vides a safer method for creditors who 
desire to extend postpetition unse-
cured credit to do so. Section 364(b) 
eliminates the need to make the diffi-
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rptcy cases. 
cult determination whether particular 
credit is extended in the "ordinary 
course of business." Section 364 (b) al-
lows the postpetition debtor to obtain 
unsecured credit outside of the ordi-
nary course of business. However, sec-
tion 364(b) requires the approval of 
the bankruptcy court after notice and 
a hearing.6 
Section 364(c) 
A debtor often cannot obtain suffi-
cient credit on an unsecured basis to 
maintain business operations. Sec-
tions 364(c) and 364(d) allow debtors 
to obtain credit on a priority basis or 
by the granting ofliens on property of 
the debtor. More specifically, section 
364(c) empowers the debtor to grant 
a postpetition lender either (1) a pri-
ority over all administrative expenses 
of the case, (2) a security interest in 
unencumbered property of the 
debtor, or (3) a junior lien on already 
encumbered property. Lending under 
section 364(c) often involves the grant 
of more than one of these incentives 
(i.e., a junior lien and priority over ad-
ministrative expenses for any deficien-
cy in the security). Section 364(c), like 
section 364 (b), requires court ap-
proval after notice and a hearing. Fur-
ther, to be able to grant the priorities 
and liens provided in section 364(c), a 
debtor must prove to the court that it 
cannot obtain the needed credit on 
an unsecured basis. 
Section 364(d) 
If even the priorities and liens pro-
vided by section 364(c) are insufficient 
to entice potential lenders to provide 
sufficient financing to a debtor, the 
debtor, with court approval, may ob-
tain credit by granting the lender a 
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. lien on property of the debtor that is 
senior to existing liens on such proper-
ty pursuant to section 364(d). The 
granting of such a lien is, however, 
subject to several statutory conditions. 
First, as with section 364(c), the debtor 
must prove that it cannot obtain credit 
on an any less intrusive basis (i.e., 
through the use of sections 364(a), 
(b), or (c)).7 Additionally, the debtor 
must prove that the interest of any 
lender whose lien is to be primed is 
"adequately protected. "8 
Section 364(e) 
Finally, lenders who have advanced 
funds based on court orders granted 
under section 364 are protected on 
appeal by section 364(e). Debtors gen-
erally have an immediate need for 
postpetition financing. Lenders would 
be reluctant to advance funds immedi-
ately ifa section 364(b) or (c) priority 
or a section 364(c) or (d) lien could 
be eliminated retroactively by the re-
versal on appeal of the order granting 
the priority or lien securing the ad-
vance. Consequently, to encourage 
lending, the priorities and liens grant-
ed to lenders pursuant to section 364 
are protected from reversal on appeal 
by section 364 ( e), so long as the order 
granting the priority or lien was 
sought in "good faith" and so long as 
a stay pending the appeal was not ob-
tained by a party opposing the grant 
of the priority or lien. 
Cross-Collateralization9 
F or a variety of business and legal reasons, debtor-in-pos-session financing is often 
provided by one of the debtor's prepe-
tition lenders. Common reasons for 
this practice include the familiarity of 
existing lenders with the debtor and 
its business and the lack of economic 
justification for a postpetition loan by 
a lender lacking a preexisting stake in 
the debtor. 
In agreeing to lend postpetition 
funds, an undersecured 10 prepetition 
lender frequently attempts to improve 
its position on its prepetition claim. For 
example, in In re SaylYrook Manufacturing 
Company, Inc., 11 the debtor owed Manu-
facturers Hanover $34 million prepeti-
tion. This prepetition obligation was se-
cured by prepetition collateral with a 
value of less than $10 million. Manu-
facturers Hanover agreed to lend the 
debtor $3 million postpetition to facili-
tate its reorganization, in exchange for 
a lien on all of the debtor's property, 
both prepetition and postpetition, 
given to secure both the debtor's prep-
etition and postpetition obligations to 
Manufacturers Hanover. 
Definition 
Securing prepetition debt with both 
prepetition and postpetition collateral 
is generally referred to as "cross-collat-
eralization." The term cross-collateral-
ization appears nowhere in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The Saybrook opinion 
refers to an earlier Second Circuit deci-
sion, In re Texlon Corp., 12 as the first ap-
pellate court decision to use the phrase 
"cross-collateralization. "13 The SaylYrook 
Court describes the Manufacturers 
Hanover loan as "Texlon-type cross-col-
lateralization."14 The phrase "Texlon-
type cross-collateralization" refers to 
granting a security interest in postpeti-
tion assets to secure prepetition obli-
gations. By contrast, a debtor might 
also grant a lien on prepetition assets 
to secure the loans of a postpetition 
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lender. This "non-Texlon-type of cross-
collateralization" is expressly autho-
rized by section 364(c). 15 The phrase 
"cross-collateralization" as used here-
inafter will only include Texlon-type 
cross-collateralization. 
Texlon 
1. Facts. The Texlon case was governed 
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. When 
Texlon filed its Chapter XI petition, 
Manufacturers Hanover was owed 
more than $700,000. The collateral se-
curing the loan was valued at less than 
the amount of this obligation. On the 
date of the petition, the bankruptcy 
court entered an ex parte order autho-
rizing Texlon to enter into factoring 
and loan agreements with Manufactur-
e rs Hanover. The financing order 
granted Manufacturers Hanover a se-
curity interest in Texlon's prepetition 
and postpetition assets to secure both 
the postpetition loan and the prepeti-
tion obligation. Within ten weeks, the 
Texlon Chapter XI case was converted 
to Chapter VII. In the postpetition 
interval, Manufacturers Hanover ad-
vanced $667,000 to the debtor. After 
repaying the $667,000 postpetition ad-
vance, Texlon had $267,000 in remain-
ing assets. 
If the cross-collateralization provi-
sion had been upheld, all of that 
$267,000 would have gone to Manu-
facturers Hanover in payment of its 
prepetition unsecured claim. The 
Chapter VII trustee requested the 
bankruptcy court to modify its origi-
nal financing order to delete the 
cross-collateralization provision. The 
bankruptcy court agreed with the 
trustee that the cross-collateralization 
provision should not have been ap-
proved. It stated that the cross-collat-
eralization clause would violate the 
basic bankruptcy principle of equality 
of treatment for like situated creditors 
without statutory authority. The court 
indicated that it would not enter such 
orders in the future, but declined to 
vacate the original order. 16 
2. Holding. The Second Circuit re-
versed the bankruptcy court; however, 
the holding was limited to the facts of 
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Texlon-particularly the fact of an ex 
parte hearing. 
A financing scheme so contrary to 
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act 
should not have been granted by 
an ex parte order, where the 
bankruptcy court relies solely on 
representations by a debtor-in-pos-
session that credit essential to the 
maintenance of operations is not 
otherwise obtainable. The debtor-
in-possession is hardly neutral. 17 
Texlon is generally recognized only for 
this narrow holding, although Judge 
Friendly's dictum, questioning the va-
lidity of cross-collateralization, is also 
often cited. 
Ellingsen and Adams Apple 
After Texlon, two other courts of ap-
peal avoided deciding the validity of 
cross-collateralization clauses. In In re 
Ellingsen MacLean Oil Company, 18 and 
In re Adams Apple, Inc., 19 the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits were confronted with 
challenges to cross-collateralization 
clauses. Both the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits ruled that section 364(e) moot-
ed the appeals of debtor-in-possession 
financing orders containing cross-col-
lateralization clauses. 
In Ellingsen, the postpetition lender 
received, as part of a section 364 ( c) fi-
nancing order, an agreement from the 
debtor not to challenge the lender's 
prepetition security interests. The 
Sixth Circuit determined that this pro-
vision was arguably covered by section 
364(c), and stated that, even if it were 
not, that fact would likely not take the 
provision outside of the protections of 
section 364(e), as long as that provi-
sion was purported to be granted 
under section 364(c) and was ob-
tained in good faith. 20 Although there 
does not appear to have been any 
cross-collateralization involved in the 
364(c) order at issue in Ellingsen, the 
court, in dicta, stated that "the mere 
allowance of cross-collateralization in 
some degree as a financing tool does 
not deprive an order of section 364(e) 
protection. "21 
In Adams Appl£, the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged that cross-collateralization 
was not expressly included in the list of 
financing devices contained in section 
364. The court then stated that cross-
collateralization is covered by section 
364; however, the court cautioned that 
its conclusion that cross-collateraliza-
tion clauses were "authorized" under 
section 364 was limited to the context 
of section 364(e) mootness and was 
not intended to prevent a panel of the 
court from holding in the future that 
cross-collateralization was illegal per se: 
"[b] ecause the bankruptcy judge 
thought that cross-collateralization was 
legal and entered an order to that ef-
fect upon which the creditor relied, we 
conclude that the creditor should re-
ceive the protection of section 364(e) 
in this case. "22 
Vanguard 
Perhaps the strongest decision en-
dorsing cross-collateralization is In re 
Vanguard Diversified, Inc. 23 In Vanguard, 
the court adopted a four-part test pro-
posed by Benjamin Weintraub and 
Professor Alan Resnick. 24 Under that 
test, cross-collateralization should be 
permitted if: ( 1) the debtor will not 
survive without the loan; (2) the 
debtor is unable to get loans from al-
ternative sources on acceptable terms; 
( 3) the lender who proposes to make 
the loan will not agree to the loan 
without cross-collateralization; and ( 4) 
the loan is in the best interest of credi-
tors.25 This test is similar to that em-
ployed in granting a senior lien under 
section 364(d), although in this situa-
tion the focus is on the protection of 
all unsecured creditors, rather than 
on the protection of one or more se-
cured creditors. 
Saybrook 
In Saybrook, the Eleventh Circuit be-
came the first circuit court to rule di-
rectly on the propriety of cross-collat-
eralization. The Eleventh Circuit in 
Saybrook concluded that cross-collater-
alization "is an impermissible means 
of obtaining postpetition financing"26 
and explained: 
[ w] e conclude that cross-collater-
alization is inconsistent with the 
bankruptcy law for two reasons. 
First, cross-collateralization is not 
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authorized as a means of postpeti-
tion financing under Section 364. 
Second, cross-collateralization is 
beyond the scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Court's inherent equitable 
powers because it is directly con-
trary to the fundamental priority 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. 27 
Goold 
After Say&rook, the District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, in Of 
ficial Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. 
Goold Electronics Corp.,28 declined to fol-
low the holding in Say&rook that cross-
collateralization was per se impermissi-
ble. Instead, it invited the bankruptcy 
court on remand to establish a test that 
would "weigh the equities" in approv-
ing or declining to approve lending 
that included cross-collateralization. It 
suggested the test applied in Vanguard, 
but clearly indicated that that test was 
not required, and that, on remand, the 
bankruptcy court was free to establish a 
test of its own. 
Contrast with Doctrine of 
Necessity /Conclusion 
In addition to being inconsistent 
with the prior holdings in Ellingsen 
and Adams Apple, and the subsequent 
holding in Goold, the Say&rook holding 
seems inconsistent with holdings in 
another developing area of bankrupt-
cy law, the doctrine of "necessity." 
Courts increasingly are permitting 
Chapter 11 debtors to make postpeti-
tion/ preconfirmation payments on 
prepetition claims to suppliers or em-
ployees, finding that such payments 
are necessary for the debtor to contin-
ue its operations. 29 The holding in 
Saybrook regarding cross-collateraliza-
tion, which prohibits cross-collateral-
ization because its allows the collater-
alization of prepetition claims, there-
by improving their chances of being 
paid, seems inconsistent with these 
cases, which authorize the actual pay-
ment of prepetition claims. If the pay-
ment of prepetition claims, in viola-
tion of the priorities established in 
section 507, can be justified by some 
sort of "necessity," it stands to reason 
that cross-collateralization may be jus-
tifiable on the basis of some similar 
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showing. If that is the case, all that is 
required is the identification by courts 
of the factors that might demonstrate 
a "necessity" for those purposes. For 
example, the Vanguard factors seem to 
establish a certain "necessity" that 
might justify cross-collateralization. 
Similarly, the bankruptcy court in 
Goold may develop such a list of fac-
tors. In any event, to the extent that 
"necessity" is valid justification for the 
payment of prepetition claims, a fac-
tored approach to the approval of 
cross-collateralization that encompass-
es the concept of necessity may be the 
best approach to deciding the propri-
ety of cross-collateralization case-by-
case. Such an approach, conducted 
under the statutory authority of sec-
tions 10530 and 364, also would likely 
balance the equality of distribution 
and reorganization objectives of the 
Bankruptcy Code as well as is possible 
in the difficult cases in which cross-
collateralization is an issue. 
Appeals of Financing Orders 
T he holding in Saybrook that cross-collateralization is per se impermissible is signifi-
cant. Equally significant, however, is 
the Say&rook approach to appellate re-
view of financing orders. 31 
Postpetition financing is generally a 
matter of some urgency. The debtor 
often needs immediate court approval 
of debtor-in-possession financing so 
that it can obtain the financing quick-
ly and continue in business. If an ap-
pellate court could overturn the pro-
tections granted to the lender by the 
bankruptcy judge in her order, most 
lenders would not be willing to fund 
the loan until all issues concerning its 
loan had been fully litigated and ap-
pealed. To ensure that lenders are 
willing to fund postpetition loans 
quickly, section 364(e) provides that 
the protections granted to postpeti-
tion lenders under a section 364 fi-
nancing order cannot be later over-
turned, unless the lenders acted in 
bad faith or the order is stayed. 
Section 364(e) provides 
The reversal or modification on 
appeal of an authorization under 
this section to obtain credit or 
incur debt or of a grant under this 
section of a priority or lien, does 
not affect the validity of any debt 
so incurred, or any priority or lien 
so granted, to an entity that ex-
tended such credit in good faith, 
whether or not such entity knew 
of the pendency of the appeal, un-
less such authorization and the in-
curring of such debt, or the grant-
ing of such priority or lien, were 
stayed pending appeal. 
Professor James J. White recently 
described the purpose of section 
364(e) and the corresponding provi-
sion in section 363, section 363(m), as 
follows: 
Necessarily bankruptcy is a con-
tentious setting; almost always 
some party will believe that a pro-
posed sale under Section 363 or a 
loan under Section 364 is contrary 
to its interest and can argue that it 
is a violation of the provisions of 
the Code. Since such sales under 
Section 363 and loans under Sec-
tion 364 are usually made in the 
presence of such inchoate threat or 
challenges, the drafters feared that 
the buyers would not buy from sell-
ers in bankruptcy and the lenders 
would not lend to them. By fore-
closing appeal - except where there 
has been something tantamount to 
bad faith - the Congress has taken 
extraordinary measures to encour-
age purchases and loans. The gen-
eral message of these sections is 
that one must protest before the 
bankruptcy judge, and if a person 
is not successful there, must get a 
stay pending the appeal, or forsake 
his case. Even where the bankrupt-
cy judge has misread the law or 
granted an impermissible right to a 
lender or buyer, the decision can-
not be overturned on appeal if the 
buyer purchased in good faith or 
the lender made its loan in good 
faith.32 
In general, the reported cases 
under section 364(e) have been con-
sistent with the above quotation from 
Professor White. As discussed in Part 
II, in Adams Apple, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the mootness doctrine ap-
plied to an order permitting cross-col-
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lateralization despite the fact that 
some courts had held cross-collateral-
ization orders invalid. Also, in Elling-
sen, the Sixth Circuit reached the 
same result with respect to an order 
barring challenges to the lender's 
prepetition liens. 
Saybrook and 364(e) 
In Saybrook, the Eleventh Circuit 
broke with the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits on this issue. The court in Say-
brook held that an appeal from a 
bankruptcy court's order authorizing 
cross-collateralization is not mooted 
by section 364(e). In so ruling, Judge 
Cox looked to the language of section 
364(e) and certain articles written by 
Professor Charles Tabb, rather than 
considering the language of the Sixth 
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit or the 
writings of Professor White. 
According to the Saybrook court, the 
relevant phrase from section 364(e) is 
the phrase "authorization under this 
section." With respect to that language, 
Professor Tabb wrote as follows: 
The primary argument made that 
lender-preference clauses are not 
protected by Section 364(e) is that 
Section 364( e), on its face, only 
applies to authorizations to incur 
debt or to obtain credit under this 
section, and the granting of a pri-
ority or lien 'under this section,' 
meaning, of course, Section 364. 
It is undisputed that lender-prefer-
ence clauses are not provided for 
expressly anywhere in Section 364 
(or anywhere else in the Code, for 
that matter). The apparently 
straightforward conclusion is that 
Section 364(e) being limited by its 
own terms to Section 364 financ-
ing orders, does not extend to 
non-Section 364 financing clauses 
such as lender-preference clauses. 
This plain meaning argument is 
consistent with the underlying 
purposes of Section 364 ( e). 33 
Because the Saybrook court agreed 
with Professor Tabb, it had to decide 
whether cross-collateralization provi-
sions were "authorized" by section 
364. As discussed in Part II, it deter-
mined that they were not, and thus 
the court held that section 364(e) did 
not protect cross-collateralization pro-
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v1s10ns on appeal. Saybrook conflicts 
with Adams Apple in holding that, for 
section 364 ( e) purposes, cross-collat-
eralization is not authorized, and con-
flicts with Ellingsen in holding that 
provisions that are not explicitly au-
thorized by section 364 but that are 
part and parcel of the financing are 
not immune from review. 
Florida West 
After Saybrook, a bankruptcy court 
in the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Florida 
West Gateway, lnc.,34 applied the Say-
brook holding regarding the availability 
of section 364(e) protection very nar-
rowly in upholding a mutual recogni-
tion of the prepetition extinguish-
ment of certain claims as part of a sec-
tion 364 financing agreement. In 
Florida West, the court limited the Say-
brook holding to cross-collateralization 
provisions, holding that Saybrook is in-
apposite because "[the lender here] is 
not collateralizing a prepetition claim. 
Rather, the Trustee is acknowledging 
that mutual obligations ... were can-
celled prepetition. "35 
Impact of Saybrook on Interpretation 
of 364(e) 
Saybrook has the potential to have a 
significant impact on postpetition 
lending practices. If taken to its logi-
cal extreme, any provision in a postpe-
tition lending arrangement that does 
not deal explicitly only with postpeti-
tion financing or the security therefor 
is not protected by section 364(e) and 
is subject to being overturned on ap-
peal under the Saybrook analysis. 
Lenders concerned about attacks on 
their security interests, as well as 
lenders concerned about potential 
lender liability claims, would likely be 
far more reluctant to "throw good 
money after bad" if under the Saybrook 
rule they could potentially not only 
lose both the good and bad money, 
but be sued after the case has con-
cluded. Conversely, if the Saybrook 
analysis is limited by subsequent 
courts to appeals of cross-collateraliza-
tion provisions, it will have a much 
smaller impact on the practice of post-
peti tion lending. This is especially 
true in iight of the current tendency, 
particularly in larger cases, for com-
petitive pressures to force potential 
postpetition lenders not to insist on 
cross-collateralization. Resolution in 
this area will have to await further de-
velopments in the case law. 
Gap Period Financing under 
Section 364 
T he issue of the availability of cross-collateralization, and the related issue of moot-
ness under section 364( e), are raised 
fairly frequently in voluntary business 
bankruptcy cases. In contrast, the avail-
ability of postpetition financing pur-
suant to section 364 is usually not an 
issue in involuntary bankruptcy cases. 
Most involuntary cases are either dis-
missed or have an order for relief en-
tered fairly quickly, leaving little time 
for an involuntary debtor to seek and 
obtain postpetition financing. More-
over, because involuntary filings are 
not planned by the debtor, the debtor 
in an involuntary case generally has 
not arranged postpetition financing 
prior to its filing, a practice that is 
quite common in voluntary filings and 
quite necessary if the financing is to be 
utilized early in the bankruptcy case.36 
In those involuntary cases in which 
the debtor does seek credit during the 
"gap period, "37 the threshold issue of 
the ability of an involuntary debtor to 
utilize section 364 is likely to be raised 
by those opposing the financing. In 
such cases, the party or parties that ob-
ject to the involuntary debtor's use of 
section 364 may claim that, as the in-
voluntary debtor has not consented to 
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court and acceded to the burdens of 
operating under the supervision of the 
bankruptcy court, it should not be al-
lowed to utilize any of the benefits of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Conversely, the 
debtor may argue that its access to 
credit has been seriously impaired, if 
not destroyed, by the filing of an un-
warranted bankruptcy petition against 
it and, consequently, it should be able 
to use section 364 to restore it to its 
prepetition credit status. 
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Neither of these two viewpoints is 
entirely correct. Instead, a middle 
ground is the most easily supported by 
sound public policy and by the lan-
guage and structure of the Bankrupt-
cy Code. 
Roxy Roller 
There is only one reported case that 
expressly deals with the issue of 
whether an involuntary debtor can 
utilize the benefits of section 364. In 
that case, In re Roxy Roller Rink Joint 
Venture, 38 the bankruptcy court faced 
an unusual set of facts. 
The Roxy Roller case began as an in-
voluntary Chapter 11 case in which the 
debtor required $120,000 to avoid im-
mediate liquidation. An insider offered 
to advance the $120,000 and, as a con-
dition of the proposed financing, 
sought priority over administrative ex-
penses and a first priority lien in an un-
encumbered lease to secure the financ-
ing, both pursuant to section 364(c). 
At an interim hearing, the court grant-
ed the debtor authority to borrow 
$15,000 from the insider, such sum to 
be granted administrative expense pri-
ority and to be secured by an interest 
in the lease. At the final hearing on the 
financing, the court granted the 
debtor's motion regarding the postpe-
tition financing in toto from the bench, 
and debtor's counsel offered to pre-
sent an order authorizing the financ-
ing for the court's signature later in 
the week. The insider subsequently 
made the loan, but the debtor's coun-
sel failed to deliver the order to the 
court and also failed to have the debtor 
and the lender execute any loan or se-
curity documents. Subsequently, all of 
the debtor's assets were sold, the case 
was converted to a Chapter 7, and the 
lender petitioned the bankruptcy court 
for an order nunc pro tune authorizing 
the financing. 
Faced with the foregoing, the Roxy 
Roller court first determined that the 
lack of loan documentation prevented 
any finding that the insider /lender 
had a lien on the lease.39 The court fur-
ther determined that, notwithstanding 
its previous ruling authorizing the 
debtor to enter into the financing, it 
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should not enter the order, nunc pro 
tune, authorizing the financing and 
granting the insider/lender a claim 
with priority over administrative ex-
penses, as it was now of the view that an 
involuntary debtor was not authorized 
to utilize section 364( c) at all.40 
Roxy Roller Analysis of 364(a) 
After providing an overview of the 
authority of an involuntary debtor to 
operate and the avoidability of certain 
transfers made by the involuntary 
debtor during the gap period,41 the 
Roxy Roller court turned to an analysis 
of the availability of section 364 to in-
voluntary debtors. The court first 
looked at section 364(a) and made 
four findings specific to that section. 
The court first noted that section 
364(a) requires that, in order to bor-
row under that section, the debtor 
must be operating under, inter alia, ei-
ther section 721 or section 1108 of the 
Code.42 Second, it found that the in-
voluntary debtor's authority to oper-
ate derives from section 303 (f), and 
not from either section 721 or section 
1108.43 Third, the court found that 
the utilization of section 364(a) by an 
involuntary debtor to create an 
administrative expense priority for a 
gap period creditor would bring sec-
tion 364(a) into direct conflict with 
sections 502(f) and 507(a) (2), which 
provide priority directly behind ad-
ministrative expenses for the 
involuntary debtor's gap period "ordi-
nary course" expenses. 44 Finally, the 
court held that an involuntary debtor 
is not a "trustee" so as to be able to 
borrow.45 As a consequence of these 
findings, the Roxy Roller court held 
that section 364(a) is not available to 
an involuntary debtor.46 
Roxy Roller Analysis of Section 
364(b) 
The Roxy Roller court next consid-
ered the availability of section 364(b) 
to an involuntary debtor. The leading 
multi-volume bankruptcy treatise, Col-
lier on Bankruptcy, states that section 
364(b) credit is available to an invol-
untary debtor. More specifically, Col-
lier states: 
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In an involuntary case credit in-
curred outside of the ordinary 
course of business before entry of 
the order for relief must be autho-
rized by the court under Section 
364(b). Such credit is entitled to 
priority as an expense of adminis-
tration under Section 503 (b) ( 1). 
Section 502(f) applies only to 
credit obtained in the ordinary 
course of business during the so 
called involuntary gap period, and 
therefore will not disqualify credit 
authorized under Section 364(b) 
from priority under Sections 
503(b)(l) and507(a)(l).47 
In disagreeing with Collier, the Roxy 
Roller court took issue with the state-
ment in Collier that section 502(£) ap-
plies only to "ordinary course" trans-
actions, and thus does not present a 
conflict with section 364(b) that dis-
qualifies an involuntary debtor from 
obtaining section 364(b) financing. 
The Roxy Roller opinion attacked this 
statement in two ways: first, it said that 
section 502(f) provides "no support" 
for Collier's assertion.48 Section 502(f), 
however, provides ample support for 
such an assertion, as it deals only with 
"ordinary course" transactions, in con-
trast to section 364(b), which deals 
with transactions outside the "ordi-
nary course." Second, the Roxy Roller 
opinion stated that allowing the use 
by an involuntary debtor of section 
364(b), but not 364(a), made little 
sense, as there was not a "sufficient 
distinction" between the two sec-
tions. 49 This statement makes little 
sense, as section 364(b) requires court 
approval, while section 364(a) does 
not. The imposition of the require-
ment of court approval allows for reg-
ulation by the court of section 364(b) 
credit extensions and would seem to 
provide a "sufficient distinction" be-
tween the sections. 
Roxy Roller Analysis of 364(c) 
In its discussion of section 364(b), 
the Roxy Roller court also considered a 
question critical to the section 364( c) 
superpriority that the debtor was seek-
ing: does the involuntary debtor have 
the status of a "trustee" during the 
gap period? Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), 
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and ( d) of section 364 all use the term 
"trustee." An involuntary debtor can 
make use of these paragraphs only if it 
has the status of a "trustee." On that 
question, the Roxy Roller court held 
that, although section 1107 equates 
the powers of a debtor-in-possession 
with those of a "trustee", and an invol-
untary debtor is a debtor-in-possession 
pursuant to section 1101 (1), the invol-
untary debtor could not be a 
"trustee," as its freedom to operate 
provided by section 303(£) was incon-
sistent with the obligations of a 
"trustee. "50 Having concluded that an 
involuntary debtor is not a "trustee," 
the Roxy Roller court held that neither 
section 364(b) nor section 364(c) was 
available to an involuntary debtor 
and, consequently, denied the 
debtor's motion for an order nunc pro 
tunc.51 Despite that holding, the Roxy 
Roller court did hold that the insider/ 
lender should be paid $15,000 pur-
suant to its interim order, as that 
order had never been appealed and 
was immune from reversal pursuant to 
section 364 ( e). 52 
Alternative Analysis 
The Roxy Roller holding that an in-
voluntary debtor is not a "trustee" for 
purposes of section 364 appears in-
consistent with the language of sec-
tion 101 (12), section 1101, and sec-
tion 1107. Section 101 (12) defines 
"debtor" as an entity against which a 
case has been "commenced." It explic-
itly does not limit the definition of 
debtor to an entity that has com-
menced a case itself. Section 1101 
makes any "debtor" a "debtor-in-pos-
session," unless a trustee has been ap-
pointed. Finally, section 1107 allows a 
"debtor-in-possession" to utilize all the 
rights and powers of a "trustee." 
Following this analysis, an involun-
tary debtor is a "trustee" and, provid-
ed that it can meet the other section 
364 requirements, is eligible to utilize 
sections 364(b), ( c), and ( d). It can-
not utilize section 364(a), as the Roxy 
Roller court held, but not for the rea-
sons that the Roxy Roller court suggest-
ed (i.e., that the involuntary debtor 
does not operate under section 1108, 
that the involuntary debtor is not a 
trustee, and that allowing such a pri-
ority would conflict with the priority 
otherwise assigned under section 
502 (f)). Instead, it is the need for the 
expense to be "allowable under sec-
tion 503(b)(1)" that prevents the use 
of section 364(a) by an involuntary 
debtor. 
The credit that is available under 
section 364(a) is that obtained in the 
ordinary course of business and allow-
able under section 503 (b) ( 1). Credit 
is only allowable under section 
503 (b) ( 1) if it is does not represent a 
claim allowed under section 502 (f). A 
claim allowed under section 502(£) in-
cludes any claim that arises in an in-
voluntary case in the ordinary course 
of the debtor's business and prior to 
the entry of an order for relief or the 
appointment of a trustee. Conse-
quently, unless a trustee has been ap-
pointed, section 364(a) is not avail-
able to an involuntary debtor53 be-
cause any claim that arises in the ordi-
nary course of an involuntary debtor's 
business (the first requirement to be 
eligible for section 364(a) treatment) 
is eligible for section 502(£) treatment 
and thus does not fulfill the other re-
quirement for section 364(a) treat-
ment (because it is not otherwise al-
lowable under section 503 (b) ( 1)). 
Allowing an involuntary debtor to 
utilize sections 364 (b), 54 ( c), and ( d), 
and, if a trustee has been appointed, 
section 364(a), is consistent not only 
with the language of the Bankruptcy 
Code but also with fundamental 
considerations of fairness. An involun-
tary debtor has been thrust into a 
bankruptcy against its will. Its credit is 
likely to be damaged, if not destroyed. 
Its cash needs will have increased, as 
all of its suppliers are likely to have 
put it on COD. It is not fair to ask the 
involuntary debtor to shoulder these 
burdens while not allowing it to ob-
tain any sort of financing other than 
ordinary course trade credit. This is 
particularly true when one considers 
that, other than credit granted under 
section 364(d) and certain 364(c) pri-
orities that have no meaning outside 
of bankruptcy,55 all of the priorities 
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and security interests that can be 
granted to a creditor under section 
364 would have been available to the 
involuntary debtor for granting to 
creditors outside of bankruptcy. The 
fairness of this availability is further 
enhanced when one considers that all 
of the types of financing available 
under this analysis must be approved 
by some third party (the court with re-
spect to section 364(b), (c), and (d), 
and the trustee in the limited cases in 
which section 364(a) is available). 
The foregoing analysis presents at 
least one conceptual difficulty: it only 
applies to involuntary Chapter 11 
cases. A debtor-in-possession is de-
fined in section llOl, which only ap-
plies in Chapter 11. 56 Further, a 
debtor-in-possession has the powers of 
a trustee pursuant to section 1107, 
which again only applies in Chapter 
11 cases. 57 Chapter 7 has no parallel 
provision that grants the Chapter 7 in-
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